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2 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent scandals have brought the issue of banking and financial sector regulation to the 
forefront. In France and in the US, legislators have reacted by introducing new legal measures 
(French law on the financial security, Sarbannes Oxley Act). 
However, accounting standards have a major impact on the information published by 
companies distributing securities to the public and thus contribute to the efficient operation of 
the sector. Consequently, the public authorities cannot afford to overlook developments in 
applicable standards. 
Before going any further, it would be appropriate to explain the meaning of some of the 
concepts or expressions used in this article. The word “norm” or “standard” comes from the 
Latin “norma” which means measure or rule. However, this does not explain how standards 
acquire legal status and thus raises questions as to the foundation for their legitimacy. Kelsen 
(1934) considers that the legal bearing of a standard resides in the fact that a sanction is 
applied in the event of a violation. 
Indeed, this criterion is traditionally used as the basis for the legality of a standard, which is in 
turn defined as the possibility of recourse to a judge or arbitrator to impose its application. 
Note that in accounting, professionals frequently distinguish between general accounting 
principles and accounting standards. The latter “are based on general accounting principles 
and are the means by which these principles are applied”. We will therefore use the 
expression accounting rules to designate the set of principles and standards which apply to 
accounting. These accounting rules also meet the criteria for legal standards described above. 
Yet the likelihood of a law being respected is increased if it has been agreed on the basis of 
general consensus. This is the key issue of accounting standardisation
1
, the need to establish a 
common ground between professionals and legislators that will serve the interests of the 
majority. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the legitimacy of the IASB to produce 
accounting standards. The paper starts with a discussion about the need for harmonisation of 
accounting standards. Then we analyse the conditions of international legitimacy for the 
production of standards, at last we apply theses conditions to the IASB in order to appreciate 
his legitimacy. 
  
 
2. The need for harmonisation of accounting standards 
 
Accounting standards play an important role in the supervision of companies. They allow 
third parties to assess the financial health of a company and provide investors with useful 
criteria on which to base their investment decisions. Accounting is designed to keep a trace of 
the company’s activities and provide a representation of its wealth and assets. Consequently, 
the contents of accounting standards can both weaken and reinforce the control exercised over 
a company by modifying the reporting obligations which it must observe. Harmonisation is 
indeed vital to ensure the effective operation of the market and the interests of the majority 
are compromised by the increasing emergence of diverse standards and the obvious risk of 
contradictions. 
 
Given the importance of the issues at stake of the accounting standards, the State justifiably 
has a major role to play. With the disappearance of international boundaries, national rules 
alone cannot ensure that the interests of the majority are respected. Harmonisation can satisfy 
individual interests by ensuring the market functions smoothly, but can also help to respect 
                                                 
1
 Standardisation can be defined as the unification or homogenisation of the applicable rules. 
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the interests of the majority. In this context, accounting standards set techniques for company 
valuations which enable external observers to monitor their activities. Accounting standards 
are thus essential tools in corporate supervision, designed to meet the objectives imposed by 
the interests of the majority. 
 
Although the interests of the member States may vary, they do share a number of common 
objectives : protection of investors, stability and security of the banking and financial system 
and the fight against organised crime and the financing of terrorism. These aims cannot be 
achieved at national level alone, and at the very least imply the application of a standard body 
of rules at international level. 
While it is justifiable in the interests of the majority for corporate activities be subject to 
certain obligations, in practice this requires techniques and tools to collect information on 
corporate operations and verify that the companies in question are actually meeting their 
established obligations. In this respect, accounting documents provide information which can 
be used to assess the management of a company and thus guide investors and partners in their 
decisions, and to detect any breaches in the law. Consequently, accounting standards ensure 
external parties have access to information on the management of a company. 
 
As indicated by Jean-Louis Fort
2
, the main problem in the banking sector is not how to assess 
the intrinsic value of an establishment for an unsolicited takeover, but how to guarantee that 
the establishment continues to operate and respect its commitments. Therefore, IASB 
standards, and in particular those relating to fair value, appear to place the interests of the 
shareholder before those of the other stakeholders such as the employees or clients, in as 
much as the main aim of shareholders is to be able to compare the performance of their 
investment in any given sector. The European Commission has supported IASC and IOSCO 
efforts to create a common set of standards for financial reporting, applicable internationally 
for stock market listing. This harmonisation of accounting standards creates better conditions 
for achieving the objectives of the Community authorities. The European directive on market 
abuses confirms that legislation concerning insider trading and market manipulation has the 
same objective: to ensure the integrity of financial markets within the Community and 
reinforce investor confidence (Colasse and Standish, 2004). It also highlights the fact that 
current Community legislation has several loopholes which could leave scope for illicit 
behaviour that would affect public confidence and the functioning of the markets
3
. One of the 
conditions for achieving this objective is a tighter control of companies which have access to 
the financial markets. And accounting standards are a means of improving this control, by 
strengthening obligations for financial reporting to third parties. 
 
This initiative can be explained by the debates which have arisen between regulatory 
authorities and accounting professionals over the application of certain international 
standards. A good case in point is standard IAS 39 which stipulates the valuation of financial 
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 Interview with Jean-Louis Fort, secretary general of the French banking commission, in n°440 of the Revue 
Française de Comptabilité, January 2002, pp. 40-47. 
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 The directive stipulates that the States must organise a professional hearing on the modification of national 
legislation, but it reassures the public authorities by stating that the States must entrust the application of the 
provisions adopted under this directive to a single administrative authority. The directive stipulates that the 
States must organise a professional hearing on the modification of national legislation, but it reassures the public 
authorities by stating that the States must entrust the application of the provisions adopted under this directive to 
a single administrative authority. 
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instruments at fair value
4
. Admittedly, IAS 39 does pose a number of problems, notably for 
banks, which, as we have already mentioned, are currently subject to international standards.  
 
The banking and financial sector offers a particularly apt insight into the issues at stake in 
accounting standardisation. Indeed, the provision of comprehensive and reliable information 
to investors is a vital condition for companies wishing to access financial markets. In an initial 
public offering, savers and investors need reliable and objective information on the activities 
and financial health of the company on which to base their investment decision, while the 
company in question must offer minimum financial guarantees. In addition, the regulatory 
authorities must have access to all the information they need to assess the activities of the 
company if they are to exercise their powers effectively. In this context, accounting 
documents have a vital role to play as the provide the vast majority of this information. 
 
The change in accounting practices as a result of the switch to IAS/ IFRS standards will have 
a major impact on European companies. In fact, this development, implies changes at various 
levels. Firstly, in the philosophy of standards: international standards place substance over 
form, which implies not so much following the standards to the letter, as respecting the spirit 
in which they were written. It is interesting to note that this philosophy is not found in US 
national accounting standards (US GAAP standards) which tend to list an infinite number of 
options. Secondly, the balance sheet approach will take priority over the income statement, 
even though, under IAS standard 1, financial reports will still include an income statement.  
Furthermore, there is a risk that company accounts will become more volatile (financial 
instruments are booked at fair value (IAS 39), stock options are booked as expenses and the 
amortisation of goodwill is replaced with an impairment test). The concerns of the banks and 
insurance companies were that the proposals would create unnecessary volatility in reported 
profits and discourage sound risk management practices (De Lange and Howieson, 2005). 
Supporters of these standards, however, stress that accounts will no longer reflect the past, but 
provide a better vision of the present and a sound indication of the future. 
 
However, the issues at stake in accounting standards go beyond the interests of individual 
companies. Indeed, this information is not only vital for shareholders and savers but also, 
more generally, for all ends of the economic spectrum (Pesqueux, 2003). The economic health 
of a company concerns its shareholders, employees and partners equally. Changing the scale 
used to assess financial information for all companies has much wider implications due to the 
role companies play in economic development. In order to maintain the financial and 
economic stability of the State, it is vital that investors have confidence in the financial 
information they receive, hence the need for reliable and objective tools with which to assess 
the value of a company. In this respect, the internationalisation of accounting standards 
concerns the State not just as a public authority intervening to regulate economic sectors, but 
also as a shareholder in public companies. 
 
The harmonisation of accounting standards is vital in order to compare companies within a 
single market where capital can circulate freely. On the one hand, the investment of savings in 
companies is an essential factor in ensuring a country’s economic development. However, in 
order for investors to decide whether to allocate their funds, they need reliable information on 
the company in question. Accounting standards are a guarantee that they have access to the 
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 The idea here is that the concept of historical cost is no longer appropriate for the current economic context. 
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details they require. Indeed, the contents of these standards will affect the image an investor 
has of a company’s financial health, and determine whether the financial information 
disclosed by a company can be deemed reliable, and thus plays an important role in 
safeguarding the interests of the investor or saver. 
 
Standards help to maintain the confidence of investors and savers in the financial and 
economic system. Consequently, given the importance of accounting standards for economic 
stability and the operation of financial markets, the intervention of the public authorities is a 
necessary condition. The State must impose legal constraints which guarantee the credibility, 
accuracy and reliability of the financial information disclosed by companies. It is therefore 
understandable that the French public authorities have taken an active interest in the auditing 
profession which supervises accounting practices and their compliance with the applicable 
regulations. 
At the publication of a series of reports in October 2002, the President of the OICV technical 
committee declared that “investor confidence is a basic condition for the correct operation of 
international financial markets. This confidence is based on their ability to access reliable and 
credible information when deciding how to allocate their capital.” The OICV stresses that the 
affirmation of these principles at an international level will provide a specific response to the 
difficulties underscored by the regulators and brought to light by the bankruptcies of a number 
of major groups
5
. 
 
After regarding the outstanding importance of harmonization of the international accounting 
standards, we’ll now study the legitimacy that could have  private organization to produce 
such standards. 
 
 
3. The Legitimacy of the IASB 
 
At international level, the legal framework may be set jointly by a number of different 
organisations, but the main role in the creation of standards falls to the IASB. However, as the 
standards it implements have an impact on the functioning of the financial markets, the IASB
6
 
works in conjunction with the IOSCO
7
. With the rapid rise in financial markets, IOSCO 
provides regulators with a vital forum for information exchange and for the study of 
developments which may be required in their activities or function. It endeavours to define 
standards which improve financial transparency for investors and the quality of information 
on company solvency submitted to the regulatory authorities. 
 
The IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) was created in 1973 by 
representatives of professional accounting associations from various countries. The purpose of 
the IFRS is to provide information useful for investment decisions of capital suppliers (IASB 
Framework). 
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 Financial reporting must be continuous. It must respect the rules stipulated in accounting standards, the 
standards established by the regulators, market listing rules, and corporate reporting obligations under the 
principles of accurate and faithful information. The Technical Committee has developed a number of principles 
for financial transparency which complement the Standards relating to reporting in a public offering, published 
by IOSCO in September 1998. It is vital that auditors be independent and the conditions under which they 
exercise their activity effectively supervised to ensure the faithfulness and integrity of the accounting 
information provided. 
6
 In April 2001, the IASC became the IASB (IAS Board) and new IAS standards were renamed IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards). 
7
 International Organisation of Securities Commissions. 
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The IASC has a series of structures which ensure it maintains a degree of autonomy from the 
bodies which govern the profession and from the financial market regulators, and also 
guarantee a rigorous procedure for the drafting, interpretation and revision of standards. 
 
On May 24, 2000, it underwent substantial reform with the adoption of new statutes
8
. Its 
technical role was separated from its organisational and promotional activities, and the 
Committee itself was converted into a foundation administrated by some “Trustees”. The 
purpose of this IASC Foundation (IASCF) is to develop a single body of high quality, 
comprehensible and practically applicable standards in the interests of the general public, to 
oblige companies to submit good quality, transparent and comparable information in their 
financial statements in order to assist participants on global capital markets in their economic 
decisions. The IASC Foundation also promotes the widespread use of these standards and 
helps to integrate existing national and international standards into high quality solutions. 
 
The IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) works under the aegis of the IASC 
Foundation and is responsible for preparing, adopting and modifying international accounting 
standards. It also develops
9
 a set of accounting rules designed to provide comparability of 
company accounts, and thereby increase their transparency. 
The IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) also plays a role as it aims to develop 
and promote a unified global accounting profession, governed by a harmonised body of 
standards
10
. Its full members are professional accounting associations recognised by law. 
However, both the IASB and IFAC are private bodies, which raises questions as to the basis 
on which private individuals can justifiably create legal standards. 
 
At their meeting in Paris on 21 June 2005 the Trustees of the IASC Foundation approved 
amendments to the organisation’s constitution which governs the IASC Foundation’s 
operational arrangements. These changes are important to reinforce the IASCF/IASB 
legitimacy. 
 
The trustees have made several changes in the constitution to enhance the organisation’s 
accountability  
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 It originally had a Board comprising two representatives of thirteen countries, selected by the IFAC, and the 
representatives of four organisations with an interest in financial reports. The Board decided on the subject of the 
standards and voted on their approval. Aside from these members, the Board also included observers from the 
European Commission, the FASB and IOSCO. It worked with Steering Committees (working groups consisting 
of four or five people charged with studying draft standards), a Consultative Group (created in 1981 and 
comprising international organisations of users of financial reports, such as IOSCO), an Advisory Council 
(created in 1995 to advise the Board on its choice of standards and the financing of the IASC), a Standard 
Committee on Interpretation (permanent committee created in 1996 with 12 members who meet to answer any 
questions on the interpretation of existing standards. All interpretations must be approved by the Board) and full-
time technical staff. 
9
 The IASC is an independent, private organisation funded by contributions from professional accounting bodies, 
companies and financial institutions, accounting companies and other bodies. 
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 The IFAC was set up in 1977, and is a non-governmental organisation, administered by a Council, which 
groups all member organisations of the IFAC. The Council elects the members of the Board and approves any 
changes in the statutes. The Board supervises the IFAC’s activities and selects the members of the various 
permanent and temporary technical committees. For more details, see the IFAC website (www.ifac.org). 
The IFAC was set up in 1977, and is a non-governmental organisation, administered by a Council, which groups 
all member organisations of the IFAC. The Council elects the members of the Board and approves any changes 
in the statutes. The Board supervises the IFAC’s activities and selects the members of the various permanent and 
temporary technical committees. For more details, see the IFAC website (www.ifac.org). 
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- by increasing the Trustees’s oversight and interaction with parties interested by 
accounting standards, 
- to improve the transparency of the organisation’s operations by introducing new 
procedures and practices, 
- to establish a high level advisory group of leaders of official international and regional 
organisations to assist the trustees in their responsibility for nominating and 
appointing individuals as trustees, 
- to respond to concern that the experiences of those from large economies outside 
Europe and North America have not been represented among the Trustees by 
expanding the number of the Trustees from 19 to 22, with a provision for two new 
appointments from Asia/Oceania, 
- to emphasise the need for, and to encourage extensive consultation through formal and 
informal mechanisms, including a reinvigorated and more effective Standards 
Advisory Council, and expanded liaison beyond existing due process requirements, 
- to highlight the commitment of the Trustees to ensuring that an independent IASB is 
composed of individual that bring to its work not only technical expertise but a broad 
range of perspectives and skills, including practical experience, 
- to take explicit note of the special needs of small and medium-sized entities. 
 
 
The following geographical distribution of the Trustees must be respected at all times: 
6 trustees from North America, 6 from Europe and 6 from the Asia/Oceania. The country of 
origin of the 4 remaining members must be such that a geographical balance is maintained. 
They are appointed for a 3-year mandate, which can only be renewed once, to carry out the 
following roles: collection of funds to finance the IASC’s activities, publication of an annual 
report on the IASC’s activities and its priorities for the coming year, appointment of the 
members of the IASB, IFRIC and SAC, evaluation of the strategy and efficiency of the IASC 
and IASB and the designation of an IASC chairman. In addition to appointing the members of 
the board, the trustees are also responsible for appointing the members of the Standard 
AdvisoryCouncil (SAC) which is a forum for organisations and individuals with an interest in 
international financial reporting. 
 
The IASB has 14 members, 12 of whom work full-time. The main qualifications for the 
membership shall be professional competence and practical experience (constitution, article 
19). The Trustees select members of the Board so that it will comprise a group of people 
representing, within that group, the best available combination of technical expertise and 
diversity of international business and market experience in order to the development of high 
quality, global accounting standards. 
 
 
 
3.1 The conditions to international Legitimacy for the production of standards 
 
Accounting standards contribute to the effective functioning of the economy. They are the 
product of efforts at standardisation by a number of national and supranational bodies. 
However, if we consider that accounting rules are legal standards, it is interesting to highlight 
that not all of these bodies are public authorities. Given the issues at stake and the potential 
consequences of the application of these standards, we can justifiably ask whether these 
bodies have legitimate authority to impose restrictive rules. 
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Following Tocqueville (1835) we could distinguish two kinds of democracy : representative 
democracy and participative democracy. A representative democracy is a form of democracy 
founded on the exercise of popular sovereignty by the people’s elected representatives. A 
participative democracy is a process emphasizing the broad involvement of constituents in the 
direction and operation of political systems. Participatory democracy strives to create 
opportunities for all members of a group to make contributions to decision-making. 
In the idea of deliberative democracy proposed by Habermas (1996), the equality is the right 
to participate to the process of decision. In a deliberative democracy legitimate lawmaking 
can only arise from the public deliberation of the citizen. 
 
The legitimacy of the IASB is based on the idea of deliberative democracy. The IASB is not 
an expression of the public authorities, but a private organization. Its principal source of 
legitimacy is based on the due process who is a process of public hearing. 
 
The above table presents the principal sources of a private organization’s legitimacy, in order 
to produce standards available in the general interest. 
 
The sources of legitimacy 
 
Internal 
 
- Professionalism 
 
- Independence 
 
- Due Process 
 
External 
 
- Clear mandate 
 
- Links with public authorities and 
with representatives organizations. 
 
The professionalism is important for the production of standards. The persons who produce 
the norms must have a high level of professionalism and technicality. The recruitement has to 
be done among the most competent persons. For Johnson and Salomons (1984) the 
institutional competence requires that the body or agency to which the authority is delegated 
possess a level of expertise and independence that is adequate to enable it  to carry out the 
assigned function properly. 
 
For the production of standards in an international level, the independence is essential. In the 
reality, in the case that a pressure group or a government dictates its rules, the different 
countries could with legitimacy refuse to apply the rules. Although, independence does not 
mean the denial to listen to the stakeholders, and therefor the due process is interesting. 
 
In a Due Process all parties are informed at the time of the production of the norms. In this 
process the persons interested have an opportunity to have their views heard. 
For Johnson and Salomons (1984) ensuring all interested parties an opportunity to present 
their views and evidence in a reasonable and timely manner requires that they be adequately 
informed of matters pending before the rule-making body and be given a sufficient 
opportunity to provide input to the process. It requires, notice and opportunity to be heard. For 
this author opportunity to be heard requires that all interested parties be adequately informed 
of matters pending before the rule-making body and be given a reasonable opportunity to 
provide informational input tot the process. An other important point is the opportunity to 
influence the process. It requires that the final selection of rules be deferred until there has 
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been a reasonable opportunity for the rule-making body to consider the informational input 
presented by interested parties. 
 
On the external sources of legitimacy we have the clear mandate. Indeed if a private 
organization gets a mandate from public bodies the legitimacy is reinforced. Especially if it is 
respecting the mandate and if this mandate is sufficiently clear to be able to judge.  For 
Johnson and Salomons (1984) a clear mandate requires an assigned function that is both 
adequately defined and properly limited in scope and an unambiguous indication of the limits 
of the delegated authority. 
 
Still concerning the external sources of legitimacy, the links with public authorities and with 
representatives’ organizations is important. If a private organization has a private mandate 
from a public authority the link allows the public authorities to provide, that the mandate is 
duely respected, and proposals can be done. 
 
 
3.2 . Application to the IASB 
 
 
Professionalism 
 
The IASC Foundation constition indicates that the main qualifications for membership of the 
IASB shall be professional competence and practical experience. The Trustees shall select 
members of the IASB so that it will comprise a group of people representing, within that 
group, the best available combination of technical expertise and diversity of international 
business and market experience in order to contribute to the development of high quality, 
global accounting standards. The Trustees shall select IASB members so that the IASB as a 
group provides an appropriate mix of recent practical experience among auditors, preparers, 
users and academics. 
For Wallace (1990) most of the representatives of the board enter with professional 
qualifications and experience in accounting and/or auditing. Many have had experience as 
members of national accounting regulatory boards. Many have served as President or Council 
members of their country’s accountancy profession or as heads of the nominationg 
organization. 
 
Independence 
 
The IASC Foundation constitution indicates that the selection of members of the IASB shall 
not be based on geographical criteria, but the Trustees shall ensure that the IASB is not 
dominated by any particular constituency or geographical interest. 
Each full-time and part-time member of the IASB shall agree contractually to act in the public 
interest and to have regard to the IASB Framework deciding on and revising standards. 
Members of the IASB shall be appointed for a term of up to five years, renewable once. The 
Trustees shall develop rules and procedures to ensure that the IASB is, and is seen to be, 
independent, and, in particular, on appointment, full-time members of the IASB shall sever all 
employment relationships with current employers and shall not hold any position giving rise 
to economic incentives which might call into question their independence of judgement in 
setting accounting standards. Secondments and any rights to return to an employer would 
therefore not be permitted. Part-time members of the IASB would not be expected to sever all 
other employment arrangements. 
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The independence of the IASB known criticism. Some people think that the influence of the 
audit industry is important (Hopwood, 1994, Wallace 2001). But we can answer that it is 
difficult to find good professional with no links with the audit industry.  
To others, and especially to EFRAG, the European interest are not taken enough into 
consideration. 
 
The due process 
 
The IASCF has published the 19 April 2006 a “IASB Due Process Handbook”. The due 
Process Handbook describes the IASB’s consultative arrangements. The procedure requires 
that all decisions are made in public meetings and that proposals receive appropriate public 
scrutiny. 
 
For the IASB the other accounting standard-setters have a role in communication the views 
and ideas of their constituent to the IASB threw the consultation process, providing a focus 
for views. Other organisations, such as representative bodies with an interest in financial 
reporting, may also contribute to the process. 
 
The due process is an important point for the IASB. The objective is that all interested parties 
has the opportunity to express itself. 
 
On this point , the EFRAG has the opinion that the Due Process should be drawn out (answer 
from EFRAG of march 10
th
, 2005, concerning the Constitutional revision). 
 
All the points of view are on certain objects not always heard. For example in the first half of 
2003, banks from the U.K., France and Germany lobbied against the IASB’s proposals on the 
mark-to-market accounting (De Lange and Howieson, 2005). 
 
The clear mandate 
 
The IASB has a clear mandate from the EU. The regulation n°1606/2002, of the European 
parliament and of the council of 19 July 2002 specify that “On june 2000, the Commission 
published its Communication an EU Financial Reporting Strategy : the way forward in which 
it was proposed that all publicly traded Community companies prepare their consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with one single set of accounting standards, namely 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), at the latest by 2005”. 
 
European Community authorities are currently leading efforts to harmonise existing standards 
in this field, as part of their goal to create financial freedom within a single domestic market. 
Indeed, the European Council held in Lisbon on March 23 and 24, 2000, cited the 
establishment of a domestic financial services market as one of its main priority. 
In this respect, it is important to improve the comparability of the financial reports of listed 
companies. Since 2001, the EC authorities have been evaluating and adopting international 
standards, and updating existing accounting directives in line with international practice. 
Clearly, the authorities are reluctant to delegate their powers to a private international body 
over which they have no influence (see Hopwood, 1994 for the political nature of the 
harmonisation debate). 
European Parliament regulations and the Council of July 19, 2002 ruled that the application of 
international accounting standards within the European Community in order to harmonise 
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financial reporting is vital to ensure the markets function correctly
11
. The idea is to impose 
identical standards on all sectors in order to facilitate the interpretation of financial reports 
(Carlson, 1997). The regulations set various conditions for the adoption of international 
standards, notably that they can only be applied if they are in the interests of the general 
public within the community
12
. Community authorities therefore have the power to block the 
application of international accounting standards within the EC
13
, but this raises the question 
of whether they can actually oppose internationally accepted standards under pressure from 
the various Community interests at stake
14
. Furthermore, in a communiqué dated June 13, 
2000 (“EU strategy on financial reporting: the route to follow”), the European Commission 
stressed that the Union should intervene as early as possible in the establishment of 
international accounting standards to avoid the possibility of rejection. 
 
The Links with public authorities and with representatives organizaions 
 
The IASCF has some links with public authorities. Moreover the IASB publishes statement 
on its working relationships with other accounting standard-setters (February 2006). The 
statement identifies a range of activities that the IASB and regional and national accounting 
standard-setters believe they should undertake in the interests of facilitating the adoption or of 
convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards issued by the IASB. 
The activities identified include : 
- communication, both between standard setters and their constituents and among 
standard-setters themselves, 
- project developments, including the ways in which other accounting standard-setters 
can assist the IASB in progressing particular projects, 
- input on IASB consultative documents, 
- the process and approaches other accounting standard-setters might employ in 
adopting or converging with IFRS’s, 
- co-operation in the development of interpretation of IFRS’s. 
 
In this statement of best practice, the Board emphasizes that to facilitate the communication 
process, the IASB should ensure that its publications are made widely on a timely basis and 
that its activities are regularly reported in various media. For the Board it is important that 
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 The main purpose of this regulation (regulation no. 1606/2002 dated July 19, 2002 of the European Parliament 
and the council for the application of international accounting standards) is to guarantee “a high degree of 
transparency and comparability in financial statements (...) and the efficient operation of the EC capital market 
and domestic market.” (article 1). 
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 Their application must provide a faithful and true representation of the financial health and results of a 
company. They must also be in the general interest of the Community and meet criteria regarding the quality of 
information provided to users. 
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 This power, which is similar to a filtering mechanism, will not be a good solution if it leads to an increase in 
non-applicable international standards. 
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 IAS 1 explicitly states that accounts cannot be deemed to have been established according to the framework of 
international accounting standards unless all IAS/IFRS solutions have been applied. If the European Commission 
does not adopt an IASB solution, we will revert to a system of Europeanised international accounting standards, 
which is neither the aim nor the spirit of regulation. Europe should make its influence felt upstream of the IASB 
decisions, and that an international accounting system where the countries decide which standards suit them is 
untenable. 
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other standard-setters use the forums on specific issues as a mechanism for encouraging their 
constituents to participate in the IASB’s standard-setting process. 
 
 
The IAS has also some links with the IOSCO. The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) is the representative body of the world’s securities markets regulators. 
IASB staff and  IOSCO work together to resolve understanding issues and to identify areas 
where new standards are needed. IOSCO representative sit as observers on the Standards 
Advisory Council and the International Financial Reporting Committee. 
 
To achieve a balance of professional background the IASC Foundation Constitution show that 
Trustees should be selected after consultation with national and international organisations of 
auditors (including the International Federation of Accountants), preparers, users and 
academics. The Trustees shall establish procedures for inviting suggestions for appointments 
from these relevant organisations and for allowing individuals to put forward their own 
names, including advertising vacant positions. 
 
 
4. Concluding comments 
 
 
In order to answer the question of whether a given body can legitimately establish legal 
standards, we first need to examine exactly how the sector is regulated. In any given sector, 
the professionals concerned can decide to act jointly to regulate their activities themselves 
(self-regulation), using contractual legal techniques or by establishing associations to 
formalise their regulatory function. By virtue of their statutes, these professional associations 
have legitimate authority to impose restrictive standards on their members, in accordance with 
the provisions of the law. However this system has a number of limits. On the one hand, the 
standards can only complete the existing law by regulating areas which it does not already 
cover. On the other, they can only be imposed on members of the professional association
15
. 
Consequently, these standards can only be completely harmonised at international if the 
applicable laws are modified. Furthermore, while professionals can use this system to define 
and implement regulations that serve their collective interests, these do not necessarily 
coincide with the interests of the majority. The State thus has a vital role to play in 
maintaining a balance between competition and the interests of the public, and in conciliating 
general and individual interests. 
Another solution for involving professionals in the regulation of their sector is the 
professional order. These are legal entities under private law, which manage a public service. 
Their regulatory powers have tended to diminish with the rise of executive powers. 
Admittedly, orders do establish the majority of codes of compliance but they must then 
submit them to the public authorities for ratification. Professional orders are intended to 
represent their particular profession, however, the interests of that profession do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the general public. Consequently, a sector cannot be 
regulated exclusively by a professional order, or more generally by sector professionals. 
Orders can be used to regulate a particular profession, but an economic sector comprises more 
than one profession. 
 
                                                 
15
 Standards may indirectly acquire a certain binding force for non-member professionals. If the professional 
body is deemed sufficiently representative, the judge may be tempted to resort to standards created by this body 
in order to assess whether the professional in question has behaved improperly in a certain situation.  
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For the accounting standards, this does not really pose a problem in the case of the State or 
international public organisations
16
. Literature has focused rather on the foundations for the 
legitimacy of regulatory authorities in the creation of legal standards and more generally for 
all bodies which define legal standards.  
 
Legitimacy can be based on the assumption of political power through democratic election - 
the body or organisation in question derives its legitimacy from the fact that its members are 
appointed by representatives of the people, or from the fact that its members are elected by 
members of the community to which the standards will apply.  
 
It has also been suggested that legitimacy can be derived from the procedures for establishing 
the standards and from the associated guarantees. We have the example of the IASB with the 
due process. This is based on the idea that rules are more likely to be accepted and followed if 
they are defined by formal procedure with the participation of those to whom they will apply. 
The rules thus become more credible as the procedure invites discussion and takes into 
account the differing interests of those concerned. Under this system, the regulatory 
authorities exercise their powers in accordance with the law and take different interests into 
account in their decisions, which are thus widely accepted. Guarantees ensure that procedures 
are objective and impartial, and thus inspire confidence in those to whom the decisions will 
apply. But for Schmidt (2002) experiences with the FASB show that an influence by specific 
interests groups drove the standard setting in certain cases. The due process is in fact limited. 
 
Faced with the diversity of the public and private bodies involved in the creation of 
accounting rules, it seems appropriate to try and outline a system for the cooperation of public 
and professional authorities to ensure that public interest is more listened. Professionals have 
a useful role to play in the definition of accounting standards due to their practical experience 
and the IASB has a strong legitimacy due to his practical experience and his independence. 
They are better able to draw on their practical knowledge of the field to create effective and 
appropriate standards. But, the different states should be acting as partners in the creation of 
accounting standards. 
 
 
The standardisation of accounting illustrates the complexity of mechanisms for creating 
standards in a global economic environment. 
The international harmonisation of standards should not be seen in a negative light, as a 
weakening of the power of the State, but rather as a necessity to safeguard the interests of the 
majority in a global market. The State must play a sufficiently active role in the accounting 
harmonisation by participating in the due process of the IASB. It is important to recognise 
that the content of accounting standards is largely determined at supranational level and that 
accounting professionals play an important role. 
This study confirms the pluralist nature of accounting rules as they are the product of the 
efforts at standardisation of a variety of bodies (private bodies, public authorities). 
Furthermore, accounting standards clearly show the close ties that exist between individual 
and general interests. 
 
                                                 
16
 The State derives its legitimacy from its democratic election. Elected representatives express the will of the 
people and translate the interests of the majority into law. On the basis of the international treaty signed by the 
member States, international organisations are legitimately authorised to establish standards applicable to those 
members. 
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